Monday 31 March 2014

Dr Thitinan Pongsudhirak



 Dr Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Mailing Address: 36/13-14 Soi Pibulsongkram 22
Nonthaburi 11000 THAILAND
(email: pongsudhirak@hotmail.com)



EDUCATION:
2001 PhD in International Political Economy
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Thesis: “Crisis From Within: The Politics of Macroeconomic Management in Thailand, 1947-97
(Awarded United Kingdom’s Best Dissertation Prize)

1992 MA, The Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Concentrations: International Economics and International Relations
1989 BA (Honours) with Distinction in Political Science
The University of California at Santa Barbara
Concentration: International Relations

EXPERIENCE:

August 2006 – present Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University

September 2006 – present Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University
Courses taught: International political economy; survey of international relations literature; social science, research skills

June 2004 – September 2006 Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University

February 2005 – present Columnist, The Bangkok Post, Contribute regular op-eds on Thai politics, Macro-economy and foreign policy

September 2002 – June 2004 Deputy Dean for International Affairs, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University

June 1993 – June 2004 Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University

November 2005 Consultant, Preuksa Real Estate (PR)
Assisted Preuksa on its road show in preparation for listing on the Stock Exchange of Thailand

March – April 2005 Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore

February – March 2004 Consultant, Airports of Thailand (AOT), Assisted the AOT on its road show in preparation for listing on the Stock Exchange of Thailand

January 1998 - 2007 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Thailand Country Analyst

March 1997 – 2007 Consultant, Independent Economic Analysis (IDEA), (Money-markets consultancy), Country Analyst, Thai politics and macroeconomy

April 1997 – 1999 Part-time Producer/Commentator, The BBC World Service, Thai Section/East Asia Today

August - September 1997 Campaign Organiser of Overseas Thais for the Constitution (OTC), an overseas Thai movement of more than 3,000 members who lobbied for the passage of Thailand’s 1997 constitution. Organized the campaign via the Internet, <www.public.iastate.edu/~stu_org/Thai/consti>

March - June 1994 Visiting Faculty Researcher, University of Tuebingen, GERMANY (Wrote a paper on comparative security organizations between ASEAN and the EU)

September 1994 - 2004 Freelance Simultaneous Translator (Thai-English)

September 1994 - 1996 Contributing Editor,The Nation, English-language daily newspaper (Columnist on current Thai politics, economy, current
affairs, and foreign relations)

August 1993 - March 1994 Research Associate Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) (Researched water allocation problems in Thailand)

June 1992 - June 1993 Reporter and Staff Writer, The Nation Wrote business news stories, with emphasis on Thai macro-economic policy, international trade and finance, stock market, and foreign direct investment

June - August 1991 Intern, Burson-Marsteller, public-relations consultancy

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

Spring 2010 Stanford University International Scholar

June 2009 Salzburg Global Seminar Faculty Member

October 2008 Japan Foundation’s Thailand Cultural Leader

November 2006 Asia Society Young Leaders Summit

March – April 2005 Visiting Research Fellowship, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

2002 National Research Council of Thailand’s Ph.D.
Dissertation Prize in Political Science and Public Administration

2001 United Kingdom’s Best Ph.D. Dissertation in Comparative and International Politics

1996 – 1999 Harvard-Yenching Ph.D. Scholarship

1991 – 1992 SAIS M.A. Scholarship

1990 – 1991 Leonard Dalsemer M.A. Scholarship

1989 – 1990 Henry Luce Graduate Fellowship

1989 B.A. Graduation with Distinction in Political Science, University of California at Santa Barbara

1988 – 1989 University of California Undergraduate Fellowship

BOOKS:

Thailand’s Trade Policy Strategy and Capacity (in Thai), co-authored with Dr Razeen Sally, Bangkok: Department of International Relations, Chulalongkorn University, 2008.

Ten Years After the Economic Crisis: Thai Democracy at a Three-Way Crossroads (in Thai), Bangkok: Double AA Publishers, 2007.

Great Issues in Thailand's Public and Foreign Policies in the Next Decade (in Thai), coedited with Abhinya Rattanamongkolmas, Bangkok: The Institute of Security and International Studies, 1994.

ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS:

Between Change and Continuity: Thailand’s Topsy-Turvy Foreign Policy Directions” in Global Asia, October-December 2009.
“The Search for A New Consensus” in Journal of International Security Affairs, Fall 2009.
“The Tragedy of the 1997 Constitution” in John Funston (ed.), Thailand’s Continuing Crises:
The Coup and Violence in the South, Singapore: ISEAS, 2009
“After the Red Uprising”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2009.
“Thailand Since the Coup”, Journal of Democracy, October-December 2008.
“Thaksin: Competitive Authoritarian and Flawed Dissident” in John Kane, Haig Patapan and Benjamin Wong (eds), Dissident Democrats: The Challenge of Democratic Leadership in Asia, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
“Mainland Southeast Asia, ASEAN and the Major Powers in East Asian Regional Order” in Jun Tsunekawa (ed.), Regional Order in East Asia: ASEAN and Japan Perspectives, Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2007.
“World War II and Thailand After 60 Years: Legacies and Latent Side-Effects” in David Koh (ed.), World War II: Transient and Enduring Legacies for East and Southeast Asia 60 Years On, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007.
“The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand” in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed.), A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Edward Elgar, 2007.
“Thaksin’s Political Zenith and Nadir” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.
“Thailand” in Russell H.K. Heng and Rahul Sen (eds), Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia, 2006-2007, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.
“Thai Politics After the 6 February 2005 General Election”, Trends Series, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), March 2005.
“Thailand’s Foreign Policy Under the Thaksin Government”, EurAsia Bulletin, Brussels: European Institute of Asian Studies, December 2004.
“The Rise of Bilateral Free Trade Areas in Asia” in Hank Lim and Chungly Lee (eds), The North-South Divide: An Appraisal of Asian Regionalism, Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Publishers, 2004.
“Globalisation and Its Thai Critics” in Yoichiro Sato (ed.) Growth and Governance in Asia, Honolulu: Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2004.
“Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism”, Southeast Asian Affairs 2003, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
“Small Arms Trafficking in Southeast Asia: A Perspective from Thailand” in Philips J. Vermonte (ed.), Small Is (Not) Beautiful: The Problem of Small Arms in Southeast Asia, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.
“Autonomy, Institutions, and the Baht Crisis”, in Dieter Mahneke, Kullada Kesboonchoo-Mead, Prathoomporn Vajrasthira, and Rudolf Hrbek (eds), ASEAN and the EU in the International Environment, Asia-Europe Studies Series Volume 4. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999.
“Thailand’s media: Whose watchdog?” in Kevin Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand. London: Routledge, 1997.
“ASEAN Security Imperatives: Lessons From European Security Cooperation”, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok: Journal of European Studies, Vol. 3, 1995.
“The Central Plains”, a chapter in Water Conflicts, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), 1995.
“Thailand’'s Foreign Economic Policies in An Uncertain Era: Arranging Priorities for the 21st Century” (in Thai), a chapter in Abhinya Rattanamongkolmas and Thitinan Pongsudhirak (eds), Great Issues in Thailand’s Public and Foreign Policies in the Next Decade (in Thai), 1994.



SELECTED OP-EDS:

The Bangkok Post, “Political realignments - backing and baramee’”, 9 October 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Abhisit’s fantastic speech about a fanciful Thailand”, 30 September 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Right-wing PAD must not resort to irredentism”, 23 September 2009
The Bangkok Post, “The coup-making coalition’s mistaken basic premise”, 18 September 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Lessons from the tragedy of 1997 charter”, 16 September 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Public played for fools in police power plays”, 11 September 2009
The Bangkok Post, “A ticking time-bomb no one’s defusing”, 9 September 2009
The Bangkok Post “Asean’s credibility and relevance in the spotlight”, 17 July 2009
The Bangkok Post, “By-election results will see a realignment”, 30 June 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Asean-Korea summit to highlight Seoul’s soft power”, 1 June 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Asean Charter faces its first major crisis”, 28 May 2009
The Bangkok Post, “The politics of charter amendment and amnesty”, 1 May 2009
Far Eastern Economic Review, “After the Uprising”, 19 April 2009
The New York Times, “Why Thais Are Angry”, 18 April 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Normalcy requires a semblance of equal justice”, 16 April 2009
OpinionAsia.org, “Thailand’s anti-establishment forces in retreat (for now)”, 15 April 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Red shirts need restraint and the way forward”, 8 April 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Don’t underestimate the red shirts’ wrath”, 3 April 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Censure may serve to strengthen govt”, 20 March 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Transport Ministry's one-airport policy smells fishy”, 13 March 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Asean’s problematic search for relevance”, 6 March 2009
The Bangkok Post, “So far not so good for Abhisit’s govt”, 6 February 2009
The Bangkok Post, “PM’s baggage confronts his political inheritance”, 30 January 2009
The Bangkok Post, “A crucial year, when foul is fair and fair is foul”, 9 January 2009
The Bangkok Post, “Expect prime minister’s political instincts to be put to the test at any time”, 19 December 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Triple whammy besets Thai economy”, 12 December 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Grinding crisis needs an accommodation”, 5 December 2008
The Bangkok Post, “The spectre of the UDD’s inexorable backlash”, 2 December 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Where is the PAD going with this?”, 27 November 2008.
The Bangkok Post, “House dissolution best way out of impasse”, 12 September 2008
The Bangkok Post, “It’s the tyranny of a PAD-led minority”, 1 September 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Autonomy is imperative for Bank of Thailand”, 21 August 2008
The Bangkok Post, “The stakes in post-Thaksin Thailand”, 13 August 2008
OpinionAsia.com, “The US and Asia After President Bush”, 11 August 2008
The Bangkok Post, “President Bush’s mixed legacy in Asia”, 8 August 2008
The Bangkok Post, “PM Samak’s futile cabinet reshuffle”, 5 August 2008
The Bangkok Post, “The politics of Preah Vihear and Phra Viharn”, 25 July 2008
The Bangkok Post, “PM Samak retakes the offensive”, 17 July 2008
The Bangkok Post, “The censure debate and its implications”, 27 June 2008
The Bangkok Post, “The hijacking of Thai democracy “, 23 June 2008
The Bangkok Post, “The People’s Alliance, then and now”, 10 June 2008
The Bangkok Post, “To avoid another coup”, 30 May 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Asean must be effective gatekeeper for victims”, 22 May 2008
The Bangkok Post, “A tale of two charters”, 15 May 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Battle lines drawn over charter changes”, 25 April 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Crisis of charter amendments looms”, 4 April 2008
The Bangkok Post, “PPP govt picks up where Thaksin left off”, 14 March 2008
The Bangkok Post, “The politics of Thaksin’s homecoming”, 29 February 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Resurgent populism under ‘B Team’”, 8 February 2008
The Bangkok Post, “Samak's prospects and longevity”, 1 February 2008
The Bangkok Post, “A grand tug-of-war still prevails”, 22 January 2008
The Bangkok Post, “When Hong Kong comes to Bangkok”, 11 January 2008
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “Let the Party Begin”, 28 December 2007
The Bangkok Post, “PPP-led govt not a foregone conclusion”, 25 December 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Populism triumphs in an emerging new Thailand”, 20 December 2007
OpinionAsia.org, “Thai Rak Thai’s Reincarnations To Win the Election”, 18 December 2007
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “The Resurrection of Thai Rak Thai”, 12 December 2007
The Bangkok Post, “The post-election numbers game”, 3 December 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Asean’s bang ends in a whimper”, 28 November 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Coalition govt a foregone conclusion?”, 13 November 2007
OpinionAsia.com, “Thailand’s Biggest Question Mark: King Bhumibol’s Health”, 11 November 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Leadership shapes electoral landscape”, 24 October 2007
The Bangkok Post, “The junta plays a new ball game”, 10 October 2007
The Bangkok Post, “ASEAN’s failure and Thailand’s shame”, 28 September 2007
The Bangkok Post, “The Politics of Gen Sonthi’s civilian role”, 27 September 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Little good about ‘good’ coup”, 19 September 2007
South China Morning Post, “Climbing on the ruins of Thai democracy”, 6 September 2007
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “A Poor Poll”, 21 August 2007
OpinionAsia.org, “Thailand’s Power Holders Put Thaksin Away”, 20 June 2007
OpinionAsia.org, “Anti-Thaksin Draft Charter is a Dead End”, 30 April 2007
OpinionAsia.org, “Thai junta in search of Exit Strategy”, 29 March 2007
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “Thailand’s Constitutional Crisis”, 24 May 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Designed to prevent monopoly”, 20 April 2007
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “A Coup Disgraced”, 12 April 2007
The Bangkok Post, “A long road to general election day”, 10 April 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Government's baht policy in disarray”, 28 March 2007
The Bangkok Post, “CNS in search of an exit strategy”, 23 March 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Reshuffle unlikely to be PM's last”, 14 March 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Crisis of leadership hits Surayud govt”, 2 March 2007
The Irrawaddy, “Thailand’s Titanic Struggle”, February 2007
OpinionAsia.org, “Thaksin is down but still not out”, 16 February 2007
The Bangkok Post, “The Surayud govt's moral setback”, 20 February 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Bangkok's two-airport imperative”, 14 February 2007
The Bangkok Post, “CNS, govt face high stakes at Suvarnabhumi”, 12 February 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Enough is definitely not enough”, 26 January 2007
OpinionAsia, “The End of Thailand (as we know it), 20 January 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Singapore's insensitive miscalculation”, 18 January 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Legal clarity becomes policy confusion”, 13 January 2007
Asia Times Online, “Thailand’s Year of Living Dangerously”, 5 January 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Objective clear, identity murky”, 4 January 2007
The Bangkok Post, “Surayud govt's technocratic debacle”, 27 December 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Alarming constitutional preferences”, 22 December 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Alarming rifts in anti-Thaksin coalition”, 15 December 2006
Asia Times Online, “Singapore's troubled Shin Corp deal”, 13 December 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Something is odd about the coup”, 24 November 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Doing a Thaksin deepens Singapore's culpability”, 13 November 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Military losing post-coup momentum”, 2 November 2006
The Bangkok Post, “No honeymoon for the general”, 3 October 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Uphill struggle ahead for coup council”, 26 September 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Stepping in to heal the breach”, 22 September 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Political implications of election delay”, 20 September 2006
The Bangkok Post, “The politics of Suvarnabhumi Airport”, 13 September 2006
The Bangkok Post, “C-in-C's olive branch anathema to CEO”, 6 September 2006
The Irrawaddy, “Thailand at the Crossroads”, September 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Behind Thaksin's self-victimisation”, 29 August 2006
The Bangkok Post, “The Democrat party’s moment of truth”, 16 August 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Brinkmanship at nation’s expense”, 7 August 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Small step in the right direction”, 31 July 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Decree does not legitimise Thaksin”, 24 July 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Thaksin goes on the offensive” 12 July 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Coupling may exonerate TRT”, 29 June 2006
The Bangkok Post, “End of beginning in Thailand’s crisis”, 19 May 2006
The Bangkok Post, “A murky way out of the political crisis”, 5 May 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Post-Thaksin economic policy challenges”, 14 April 2006
The Bangkok Post, “The political standoff is not over”, 7 April 2006
The Bangkok Post, “PAD needs to regroup and rethink”, 29 March 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Thaksin’s endgame is now in sight”, 17 March 2006
International Herald Tribune, “Thailand: Thaksin’s challengers have responsibility, too”, 14 March 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Boycott: the easy, but wrong, way out”, 28 February 2006
The Bangkok Post, “PM must dissolve House now, or resign in disgrace later”, 24 February 2006
The Bangkok Post, “House dissolution is best way out”, 10 February 2006
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “Thai Democracy’s ‘Tumultuous Standoff’, 9 February 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Is Temasek complicit in scandal?”, 6 February 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Perception, not the substance, is vital”, 3 February 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Thaksin’s political insurance policy”, 26 January 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Thaksin’s political survival at stake”, 13 January 2006
The Bangkok Post, “Sondhi should go back to his office”, 9 December 2005
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “Thai Democracy on the March”, 2-4 December 2005.
The Bangkok Post, “Egat could be Thaksin’s undoing”, 28 November 2005
The Bangkok Post, “The de-mystification of PM Thaksin”, 20 September 2005
The Bangkok Post, “Latent effects from Thailand’s brush with the great war”, 16 August 2005
The Bangkok Post, “Thailand’s wartime balancing act”, 15 August 2005
The Irrawaddy, “A Win-Win-Win Proposition for Thaksin”, August 2005
The Bangkok Post, “What next after the emergency decree?”, 22 July 2005
The Bangkok Post, “The hawks now in complete charge”, 19 July 2005
The Bangkok Post, “’Thaksinomics’ ignores the reality”, 15 July 2005
The Bangkok Post, “The ‘little empires’ are striking back”, 28 June 2005
The Bangkok Post, “Seeing through obfuscation”, 24 May 2005
The Bangkok Post, “Bloody events have mixed legacy”, 20 May 2005
The Straits Times, “Stay the course on southern troubles”, 9 April 2005.
The Straits Times, “Thaksin’s second chance in Thailand”, 26 March 2005.
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “Facing Up to Thailand’s Separatism”, 11 November 2004
The Asian Wall Street Journal, “Thaksin Flirts With Liverpool”, 26 May 2004
The Bangkok Post, “Thaksin casts a wide spell”, 19 January 2004.
Far Eastern Economic Review, “Behind Thaksin’s War on Terror”, 25 September 2003.
International Herald Tribune, “No dissent in Bangkok?”, 5 March 2002.
International Herald Tribune, “But the Prime-Minister-to-Be Could Be Ruled Out”, 10 January 2001.
International Herald Tribune, “Thailand’s Incompetent Government Cries Out for Reform,” 12 August 1997.
International Herald Tribune, “One Year After the Thai Crisis: Some Winners and Losers”, 2 July 1998.
Far Eastern Economic Review, "Avoid the 18th coup," (5th column), 4 April 1991.
*** Additional op-eds written for The Nation and Bangkok Post available on request.

OTHER MEDIA:

TELEVISION: Commented on Thai politics and macro-economy for CNN, CNBC, BBC
World, Bloomberg TV, NHK, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Channel News Asia,
Reuters TV, AFPTV, APTV, PBS, Al Jazeera, BBC2 Newsnight Program, Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, Star TV News, The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (May 1992), and
local Thai TV stations 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, TNN, and TV Thai.

PRINT AND RADIO:

 Quoted in The Economist, The Financial Times, The New York
Times, Time, Newsweek, Bloomberg News, International Herald Tribune, The Washington Post, The Guardian, The Times of London, The Daily Telegraph, Le Figaro, Le Match, Der Spiegel, Straits Times, Today, New Straits Times, Sydney Morning Herald, The Star, USA Today, Boston Globe, Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Kyodo News, Nikkei, Far Eastern Economic Review, Asian Business, Reuters, AP, AFP, Bloomberg, National Public Radio, Voice of America, Radio Singapore, Radio Australia, Radio Scotland, BBC World Service
East Asia Today, and BBC NewsHour, among other broadcast outlets



OTHER BACKGROUND DETAILS:

Languages: Thai (native); Thai and English (bilingual); French (functional)
Hobbies: Competition-level tennis; maps
Marital Status: Married to Dr Pavida Pananond, with one daughter.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thitinan_Pongsudhirak

Saturday 29 March 2014

သန္းေခါင္စာရင္း


    မနက္ျဖန္ ၂၀၁၄ ခုႏွစ္ မတ္လ ၃၀ ရက္ဆိုရင္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံမွာ သန္းေခါင္စာရင္းေကာက္ လုပ္ငန္းေတြ စတင္ေတာ့မွာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ႏိုင္ငံတစ္ခုအေနနဲ႕ မလုပ္မျဖစ္ လုပ္ရမယ့္ အလုပ္တစ္ခုကို ႏွစ္ေပါင္းမ်ားစြာ ပ်က္ကြက္ေနရာကေန ျပန္လည္စတင္လိုက္ျခင္းလည္း ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ျမန္္မာ့ေႏြဦးအေျပာင္းအလဲမ်ားအနက္ သန္းေခါင္စာရင္း ေကာက္ယူႏိုင္ျခင္းဟာလည္း မွတ္တမ္းတင္သင့္တဲ့ သမိုင္း မွတ္တိုင္တစ္ခု ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ သမၼတဦးသိန္းစိန္ ရာထူးလက္ခံ မိန္႕ခြန္းေျပာတဲ့အထဲမွာ ျပည္ေထာင္စု အစိုးရက တင္သြင္းမယ့္ ဥပေဒျပဳေရး အစီအစဥ္ ၁၀ ခ်က္ကို ထုတ္ေဖာ္ေျပာၾကားခဲ့ေပမယ့္ သန္းေခါင္စာရင္း ေကာက္ယူျခင္းကေတာ့ ပါ၀င္ခဲ့ျခင္း မရွိပါဘူး။ ရာထူးလက္ခံ မိန္႕ခြန္းေျပာတဲ့အခ်ိန္မွာ သန္းေခါင္စာရင္းေကာက္ယူဖို႕ ျပည္ေထာင္စုအစိုးရကို တုိက္တြန္းေၾကာင္းအဆိုကို ျပည္ေထာင္စု လႊတ္ေတာ္က အတည္ျပဳၿပီး ျဖစ္ေနပါၿပီ။ ဘယ္သူကပဲ စခဲ့တဲ့ဇာတ္လမ္းျဖစ္ျဖစ္ မျဖစ္မေနလုပ္ရမယ့္ အလုပ္တစ္ခုကို မနက္ျဖန္ စလုပ္ေတာ့မွာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ သန္းေခါင္စာရင္းေကာက္ယူမွဳနဲ႕ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး ျပည္ေထာင္စုလႊတ္ေတာ္က ျပဌာန္းထားတဲ့ ဥပေဒကို ဒီေနရာမွာ ေဒါင္းလုတ္ရယူႏိုင္ပါတယ္။ http://www.president-office.gov.mm/?q=hluttaw/law/2013/07/31/id-3932
ဒါ့အျပင္ သန္းေခါင္စာရင္းနဲ႕ပတ္သက္ၿပီး ေရးထားတဲ့ စာစုေလးတစ္ခုကိုလည္း ဒီေနရာမွာ သြားေရာက္ ဖတ္႐ွဳႏိုင္ပါတယ္။ http://www.myanmarthway.blogspot.com/2014/03/population-and-housing-census-2014.html
အထက္မွာ တင္ထားတဲ့ ပံုကိုေတာ့ ေဖာ္ျပပါ ဘေလာ့စာမ်က္ႏွာက ကူးယူထားတာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ၀မ္းေျမာက္စြာ ႀကိဳဆိုလိုက္ၾကပါစို႕

Friday 28 March 2014

ကာကြယ္ေစာင့့္ေရွာက္ဖို႕ မလိုအပ္ေတာ့ဘူးလား

 ဓာတ္ပံု- ေဂ်ေမာင္ေမာင္ (အမရပူရ)
           ၆၉ ႏွစ္ေျမာက္ တပ္မေတာ္ေန႕ စစ္ေရးျပအခမ္းအနားမွာ တပ္မေတာ္ကာကြယ္ေရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္က ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒကို ထိန္းသိမ္းကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ သြားပါမယ္လို႕ မိန္႕ခြန္းထဲ ထည့္ေျပာတာကို မီဒီယာတစ္ခ်ိဳ႕က အထူးအဆန္း သတင္းလုပ္ေရးၾကတာကို ေတြ႕ရပါတယ္။ ဒီမိုကေရစီစနစ္နဲ႕ ခ်ီတက္ေနတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံတစ္ခုမွာ လက္နက္ကိုင္တပ္မေတာ္ဟာ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ထိန္းသိမ္းကာကြယ္ ေစာင့္ေရွာက္တယ္ဆိုတာ ဘာမ်ား ဆန္းၾကယ္ေနပါသလဲ။ တပ္မေတာ္က အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ထိန္းသိမ္းကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ဖို႕ မလိုအပ္ဘူးလား။
    ဒါနဲ႕ပတ္သက္ၿပီး ေျပာရရင္ တပ္မေတာ္သားတစ္ေယာက္ရဲ႕ ဘ၀ အစကို ေျပာျပမွ ျပည့္စံုမယ္ ထင္ပါတယ္။ ျမန္မာ့တပ္မေတာ္ကို စစ္မွဳထမ္းအျဖစ္ စတင္ ၀င္ေရာက္ၿပီဆိုတာနဲ႕ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အလံကို လက္နဲ႕ ထိၿပီး ကတိသစၥာျပဳၾကရပါတယ္။ ကတိသစၥာျပဳရမယ့္ စာသားကို ၁၉၅၉ တပ္မေတာ္ အက္ဥပေဒ ပုဒ္မ ၁၆ မွာ အခုလို ေရးထားတာ ေတြ႕ရပါတယ္။

     "ကၽြန္ုပ္သည္ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံု အေျခခံ ဥပေဒကို မိမိ၏ အသက္စြန္႕၍ပင္ ထိန္းသိမ္းေစာင့္ေရွာက္ပါမည္ ဟူ၍လည္းေကာင္း တပ္မေတာ္တြင္ ဝင္ေရာက္ အမွဳထမ္း၍ ကုန္းေၾကာင္း ခရီးျဖင့္ ျဖစ္ေစ ေရေၾကာင္းခရီးျဖင့္ ျဖစ္ေစ ေလေၾကာင္း ခရီးျဖင့္ျဖစ္ေစ မည္သည့္ ေနရာ အရပ္သို႕မဆို အမိန္႕ေပးသည့္အတိုင္း မိမိ၏ အသက္စြန္႕၍ပင္ သြားမည္ဟူ၍ လည္းေကာင္း မိမိကို အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေသာ အထက္အရာရွိ တစ္ဦးဦး၏ အမိန္႕အားလံုးကို မိမိ၏ အသက္စြန္႕၍ပင္ နာခံပါမည္ ဟူ၍ လည္းေကာင္း ကတိသစၥာ ျပဳပါသည္။"

    အဲသည္ ၁၉၅၉ တပ္မေတာ္ အက္ဥပေဒဆိုတာ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံမွာ ပထမဆံုး ျပဌာန္းခဲ့တဲ့ ၁၉၄၇ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒ ဇယား (၃) မွာပါတဲ့ ျပည္ေထာင္စု ဥပေဒျပဳစာရင္းအရ ေရးဆြဲျပဌာန္းခဲ့ၿပီး အခုထိတိုင္ လိုက္နာက်င့္သံုးေနဆဲ ဥပေဒတစ္ခုျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒါ့အျပင္လက္ရွိ က်င့္သံုးေနတဲ့ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒ ပုဒ္မ ၂၀(စ) မွာလည္း တပ္မေတာ္သည္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံု အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ရန္ အဓိက တာ၀န္ရွိသည္ လုို႕ ျပဌာန္းထားပါတယ္။
    ကမာၻေပၚမွာ ဒီမိုကေရစီ ဘိုးေအႀကီးလို႕ တင္စားေနၾကတဲ့ အေမရိကန္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုမွာလည္း အလားတူပါပဲ။ အေမရိကန္တပ္မေတာ္မွာ စစ္မွဳထမ္းအျဖစ္ စာရင္းသြင္းတဲ့ စစ္သည္ေတြဟာ အခုလို ကတိသစၥာျပဳ ၾကရပါတယ္။
   
"I, XXXXXXXXXX, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God."

    ဒီလို လက္နက္ကိုင္ တပ္မေတာ္ေတြ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ထိန္းသိမ္းကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ဖို႕ ဘာလို႕ လုိအပ္သလဲဆိုရင္ တစ္ျခားေသာ ႏိုင္ငံေရး အဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားအေနနဲ႕ပဲ ျဖစ္ျဖစ္ လူပုဂၢိဳလ္ တစ္ေယာက္ခ်င္းအေနနဲ႕ပဲျဖစ္ျဖစ္ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို စကၠဴစုတ္သာသာ သေဘာထားၿပီး ေျမာင္းထဲေရာက္ေအာင္ လုပ္ခ်င္ရင္ ေလနဲ႕သာ လုပ္လို႕ ရပါလိမ့္မယ္။ လက္နက္ကိုင္ထားတဲ့ တပ္မေတာ္ကေတာ့ သူ႕မွာ လက္နက္ရွိိတဲ့အတြက္ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ေျမာင္းထဲပို႕ခ်င္ရင္ တကယ္ပို႕ႏိုင္တဲ့အစြမ္းလည္း ရွိေနပါတယ္။ ဒါေၾကာင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေရးစနစ္တစ္ခုကို ေရရွည္တည္တံ့ခိုင္ၿမဲေစဖို႕အတြက္ဆိုရင္ လက္နက္ကိုင္တပ္ဖြဲ႕ေတြအေနနဲ႕ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ကိုယ္တိုင္လည္း လိုက္နာဖို႕လုိသလို အျခားသူေတြကလည္း အေျခခံဥပေဒကို စကၠဴစုတ္ လုပ္မပစ္ႏိုင္ေအာင္ ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ႏိုင္ဖို႕ အထူးတာ၀န္အပ္ႏွင္းထားရတာပါ။
    အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္တယ္ဆိုတာကို အေကာက္အယူလြဲၾကတဲ့ အျမင္ေတြကိုလည္း မၾကာမၾကာဆိုသလို ၾကားသိေနရပါတယ္။ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္တယ္ဆိုတာ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို လံုး၀(လံုး၀) မျပင္ဆင္ေစရ လို႕ အဓိပၸာယ္ဖြင့္ဆိုၿပီး တပ္မေတာ္က အေျခခံဥပေဒ ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္မွဳအေပၚ ျပစ္တင္ေ၀ဖန္ေနတာေတြကိုလည္း ၾကားသိေနရပါတယ္။ တကယ္ေတာ့ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္တယ္ဆိုတာ အေျခခံဥပေဒမွာ ျပဌာန္းထားတဲ့အတိုင္း အာဏာသက္ေရာက္ေစဖို႕နဲ႕ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ေက်ာ္လြန္ေဆာင္ရြက္ျခင္း မျပဳႏုိင္ၾကေစဖို႕ ထိန္းသိမ္းေဆာင္ရြက္တဲ့သေဘာသာျဖစ္ၿပီး အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ျပင္ဆင္ဖို႕ လိုအပ္တယ္ဆိုရင္လည္း အေျခခံဥပေဒမွာ ျပဌာန္းထားတဲ့ အတိုင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ႏိုင္ဖို႕ သေဘာတူခြင့္ျပဳထားၿပီးသား ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
    အေျခခံဥပေဒနဲ႕ အလွမ္းေ၀းတဲ့၊ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ေသေသခ်ာခ်ာ ဖတ္႐ွဳထားျခင္းမရွိတဲ့ သာမန္လူေတြထဲက အဲသလို နားလည္မွဳ လြဲတယ္ဆိုတာကို ဘာမွ မေျပာလိုေပမယ့္ ႏိုင္ငံေရးကို တကယ္ထဲထဲ၀င္၀င္ လုပ္ေနၾကတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီမ်ားအေနနဲ႕ကေတာ့ ဒါကို အဓိပၸာယ္ေကာက္ မလြဲသင့္ပါဘူး။ ဒါမွမဟုတ္ အဓိပၸာယ္ တလြဲေကာက္ၿပီး ျပည္သူကို ေခ်ာက္မခ်သင့္ပါဘူး။ ျပည္သူလူထုကို ႏိုင္ငံေရးအသိအျမင္ နားမ်က္စိေတြ ဖြင့္ေပးဖို႕က ဆိုခဲ့ပါ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီေတြ ႏိုင္ငံေရး လွဳပ္ရွားတက္ၾကြသူေတြမွာ အမ်ားႀကီး တာ၀န္ရွိပါတယ္။ ျပည္သူလူထုဆိုတာ နလပိန္းတံုးပါပဲဆိုတဲ့ သေဘာနဲ႕ လွည့္စားတိုင္းခံရမယ္ဆိုၿပီး ကိုယ့္ပါတီရည္မွန္းခ်က္အတြက္ အသံုးခ်ဖို႕ မဟုတ္ဘဲ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တိိုးတက္ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရးအတြက္ပဲ ျဖစ္ျဖစ္၊ ဒီမိုကေရစီ ရွင္သန္ခိုင္မာေရးအတြက္ပဲ ျဖစ္ျဖစ္ ျပည္သူလူထုရဲ႕ နားမ်က္စိကို တတ္ႏိုင္သေလာက္ဖြင့္ေပးၿပီး ျပည္သူေတြကိုယ္တုိင္ ခ်ီတက္ႏိုင္ေအာင္ လုပ္ေပးရမွာပါ။
    ဒီေနရာမွာ ဒါကို ဘာလို႕ ထည့္ေျပာရသလဲ ဆိုရင္ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီႀကီးတစ္ခုရဲ႕ ေခါင္းေဆာင္ဆိုသူက ၿပီးခဲ့တဲ့ မိုးကုတ္ၿမိဳ႕ ခရီးစဥ္ ေဟာေျပာပြဲမွာ တပ္မေတာ္သားေတြက ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ပါမယ္လို႔ ကတိသစၥာျပဳတာဟာ ျပည္သူေတြရဲ႕ အက်ိဳးစီးပြားကို ထိပါးရာေရာက္တယ္လုိ႔ ထည့္သြင္း ေျပာၾကားသြားခဲ့လို႕ပါပဲ။ အဲသည္စကားရဲ႕ အက်ိဳးဆက္ကို တြက္ဆၾကည့္ၾကပါစို႕။ သူဆိုလိုခ်င္တာက တပ္မေတာ္ဟာ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ဖို႕ မသင့္ဘူးဆိုတဲ့ အဓိပၸာယ္ သက္ေရာက္ပါတယ္။ ခုခ်ိန္မွာ အာဏာမရေသးေပမယ့္ တစ္ခ်ိန္မွာ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲ မဲအမ်ားဆံုးရၿပီး အစိုးရဖြဲ႕ႏိုင္ေျခရွိတဲ့ ပါတီႀကီးတစ္ခု ျဖစ္တာနဲ႕အညီ အေျခခံဥပေဒထဲက ဆိုခဲ့ပါ ျပဌာန္းခ်က္ကိုလည္း ဆိုခဲ့ပါ ပါတီႀကီးက ပယ္ဖ်က္လိုက္ႏိုင္ၿပီဆိုပါေတာ့။ တပ္မေတာ္ဟာ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ဖို႕ မလိုေတာ့ပါဘူး။ လက္နက္ကိုင္ထားတဲ့ တပ္မေတာ္ဟာ လုပ္ခ်င္ရာ လုပ္လို႕ ရသြားၿပီဆိုတဲ့ အဓိပၸာယ္ သက္ေရာက္ပါတယ္။ သမၼတအမိန္႕ကို နာခံစရာ မလိုေတာ့ဘူးဆိုတဲ့ အဓိပၸာယ္ သက္ေရာက္ပါတယ္။ တပ္မေတာ္ပိုင္ စီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းေတြက ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ကို ေဆာင္သင့္ေဆာင္ထိုက္တဲ့ အခြန္အခေတြ ေပးေဆာင္ခ်င္မွေပးေဆာင္မယ္ မေပးဘဲ ေနခ်င္ ေနလို႕ရတယ္ဆိုတဲ့ အဓိပၸာယ္ သက္ေရာက္ပါတယ္။ ကုန္ကုန္ေျပာရရင္ လက္နက္အားကိုးနဲ႕ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ကို အာဏာသိမ္းခ်င္လည္း သိမ္းလို႕ရတယ္ဆိုတဲ့ အဓိပၸာယ္ထိ သက္ေရာက္သြားပါတယ္။
    ဗိုလ္ေကာင္းလို သာမန္ ေက်ာင္းသားေလး တစ္ေယာက္ကေတာင္ ဒါကို ဒီေလာက္ ေတြးမိတယ္ဆိုရင္ အဲသည္စကားကို ေျပာၾကားခဲ့တဲ့ ကမာၻေက်ာ္ပုုဂၢိဳလ္ႀကီးက ဒါကို မသိဘဲေနမွာ မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ ဒါဆိုရင္ ဒီေလာက္ အႏၱရာယ္ႀကီးတဲ့စကားကို ဘာသေဘာနဲ႕ ေျပာခဲ့တာပါလိမ့္။ ဗိုလ္ေကာင္း ဉာဏ္မမီေတာ့လို႕ ကိုယ့္ဘာသာကိုယ္သာ ဆက္စဉ္းစားၾကည့္ၾကပါေတာ့ လို႕ ေျပာလိုက္ပါရေစ။

ေႏြဦးဂီတ


ေႏြဦးဂီတ
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တစိမ့္စိမ့္ႏွင့္
ႏွစ္သိမ့္ၾကည္ႏူး ရြက္သစ္ဖူးေသာ္
ရႊင္ျမဴးအံ့ၾသ ေဖာ္ခ်င္းေႏွာ၍
ေတာင္ေတာသာခြင့့္ ရာသီဖြင့္လ်က္
ပင္ျမင့္ထက္တြင္ ငွက္သဘင္လည္း
တူယွဥ္ႏွစ္ကို ခ်စ္တင္းဆိုသည္
မပို၏သို႕ ပို၏သိုု႕

တသိမ့္သိမ့္ႏွင့္
ၫွင္းၿငိမ့္ေလေပြ ထက္၀န္းေ၀လ်က္
ေႏြလည္းအ၀င္ ေဆာင္းလွ်င္အစဲ
မတည္ဘဲလွ်င္
ဖက္လွဲတကင္း ပန္းနံ႕သင္းကို
ခ်ဉ္း၍ခ်ဉ္း၍ ေဆာင္ကာေ၀ွ႕လ်က္
ရႊန္းေျမ့သလို သြင္းလာပိုသည္
မခ်ိဳ၏သို႕ ခ်ိဳ၏သို႕

တၿငိမ့္ၿငိမ့္ႏွင့္
လွိမ့္၍လွိမ့္၍ ေလအေ၀့၀ယ္
ေၾကြေျမ့ခမန္း အသံစမ္းလ်က္
သာဆန္းရဂံုေဗြ ေႏြဦးေမလွ်င္
ေမွ်ာ္ေလေယာင္ေမာ့ ေတးကိုေက်ာ့၍
ေလးေတာ့္နတ္သြင္ ထက္၀န္းက်င္ကို
ၾကည္ရႊင္ခလို ခ်စ္ဖြယ္ဆိုသည္
မပ်ိဳ၏သို႕ ပ်ိဳ၏သို႕

တၿခိမ့္ၿခိမ့္ႏွင့္
သံနိမ့္သံျမင့္ သံခ်ိဳဆင့္၍
ခါသင့္မထင္ မိုးနတ္ရွင္လည္း
ရွစ္ခြင္တလႊား ေျမးကစား၍
လွည့္စားေလဟန္ မိုးရိပ္ဖန္လ်က္
နဘံတခို တိမ္ခိုးသုိသည္
မၫို၏သို႕ ၫို၏သို႕

နန္းၫြန္႕ေဆြ

Tuesday 25 March 2014

စစ္ေအးကာလမၿပီးေသးတဲ့ အိႏၵိယရဲ႕ ႏိုင္ငံျခားေရးမူ၀ါဒ


႐ုရွားက ခ႐ုိင္းမီးယားကို ၀င္ေရာက္ခဲ့တာနဲ႔ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး ႏိုင္ငံတကာအသိုင္းအ၀ိုင္းက စိုးရိမ္ပူပန္တဲ့အသံေတြ ထြက္လာခဲ့ပါတယ္။ အေမရိကန္နဲ႕ ဥေရာပ သမဂၢကေတာ့ အသံအက်ယ္ဆံုးေပါ့။ တ႐ုတ္တို႕ အီရန္တို႕လို ႏိုင္ငံမ်ိဳးေတြကေတာင္မွ ႐ုရွားရဲ႕ လုပ္ရပ္ကို ေ၀ဖန္ျပစ္တင္ခဲ့ၾကတယ္။ က်ဴးဘားတို႕ ဗင္နီဇြဲလားတို႕ ဆီးရီးယားတို႕ကေတာ့ ေထာက္ခံၾကတာေပါ့ေလ။ ဒါေပမယ့္ ႐ုရွားေနာက္မွာ ရပ္တည္တဲ့သူေတြထဲမွာ အိႏၵိယ ပါေနတာကေတာ့ စဥ္းစားစရာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
ခ႐ိုင္းမီးယားမွာ ရွိိတဲ့ ႐ုရွားရဲ႕ တရား၀င္အက်ိဳးစီးပြားနဲ႕ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး ေလးစားသမွဳျပဳရမယ္လို႕ အိႏၵိယက ရွင္းရွင္းလင္းလင္း ထုတ္ေဖာ္ေျပာၾကားလိုက္တာ ကေတာ့ အိႏၵိယနဲ႕ပတ္သက္တဲ့ အေမရိကန္မူ၀ါဒကို မထင္မွတ္တဲ့ ႐ိုက္ခ်က္တစ္ခု ျဖစ္သြားခဲ့ပါတယ္။ ကမာၻေပၚမွာ အႀကီးဆံုးေသာ ဒီမိုကေရစီႏိုင္ငံႀကီးလည္းျဖစ္၊ အရင္းရွင္စီးပြားေရးစနစ္ကလည္း ေကာင္းေကာင္း အလုပ္ျဖစ္ေနတဲ့အျပင္ စစ္အင္အားကလည္း ႀကီးထြားလာေနတဲ့ အိႏၵိယဟာ ေဒသတြင္း အင္အားႀကီးလာတဲ့ တ႐ုတ္ကို ထိန္းၫွိမယ့္ ခ်ိန္ခြင္လွ်ာတစ္ခုအျဖစ္သာမက အေမရိကန္ဦးေဆာင္တဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံတကာ ဆက္ဆံေရး ပံုစံကို ေနရာေရြ႕မသြားေအာင္ ထိန္းသိမ္းေပးမယ့္ ေက်ာက္ဆူးတစ္ခုလို ထင္ျမင္ယူဆ ထားခဲ့ၾကတာပါ။ ခ႐ိုင္းမီးယားအေရးမွာ အိႏၵိယက ႐ုရွားကိုေထာက္ခံလိုက္တာေၾကာင့္ အေမရိကန္ မူ၀ါဒခ်မွတ္သူေတြ ဗ်ာမ်ားသြားသင့္ပါတယ္။
မၾကာခင္ေတြ႕ျမင္ရေတာ့မယ့္ ဗဟုမ႑ိဳင္ကမာၻႀကီးမွာ အိႏၵိယက ဘယ္လို အသံုးေတာ္ခံ တင္ဆက္ေတာ့မလဲဆိုတာေတာ့ အင္မတန္ ရွင္းျပရခက္တဲ့ ဇာတ္လမ္းတစ္ပုဒ္ ျဖစ္လာေတာ့မွာပါ။
ပူတင္ကို အိႏၵိယက ေထာက္ခံလိုက္တဲ့ကိစၥဟာ အေနာက္အင္အားအဖို႕ေတာ့ အိႏၵိယကို မိတ္ေဆြအျဖစ္ လက္မခံေတာ့ဖို႕ အခ်က္ေပးလိုက္သလိုပါပဲ။ တကယ္ေတာ့လည္း ဆိုဗီယက္ယူနီယံ ၿပိဳကြဲကတည္းက အိႏၵိယ ေလသံေျပာင္းခဲ့တာပါ။ အိႏၵိယက သူ႕ရဲ႕ စီးပြားေရးမွာ ေျဖေလွ်ာ့မွဳေတြ လုပ္ၿပီးတဲ့ေနာက္ အဓိကက်တဲ့ အေရးအရာေတြမွာ မဟာဗ်ဴဟာမိတ္ဘက္ ျဖစ္ခဲ့တယ္။ ဒါေပမယ့့္လည္း ႏွစ္ေပါင္း ႏွစ္ဆယ္ေလာက္ ရင္းရင္းႏွီးႏွီး လက္တြဲ လုပ္လာခဲ့တယ္ဆိုတာနဲ႕ အိႏၵိယ-အေနာက္အုပ္စု အက်ိဳးစီးပြားေတြ အေ၀တည့္ေနတာကို သစၥာတရားလို ခိုင္ၿမဲမယ္လို႕ေတာ့ မယူဆသင့္ပါဘူး။ ဥေရာပမွာ စစ္ေအးတိုက္ပြဲကို ေမ့ထားခ်ိန္မွာ အိႏၵိယအတြက္ကေတာ့ စစ္ေအးကာလာ ႏိုင္ငံတကာဆက္ဆံေရး ပံုစံေတြက ဘယ္ေတာ့မွ အဆံုးသတ္သြားမွာ မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ အထူးသျဖင့္ အင္ဒို-႐ုရွား ဆက္ဆံေရးဟာ အိႏၵိယရဲ႕ အဂၢမဟာဗ်ဴဟာအတြက္ ဆက္လက္ အေရးပါေနအံုးမွာပါပဲ။
ဆိုဗီယက္အင္ပါယာႀကီး ၿပိဳကြဲၿပီးတဲ့ေနာက္မွာ အိႏၵိယရဲ႕ န်ဴကလီးယား အစီအစဥ္ေတြကို အေမရိကန္က မဟန္႕တား ႏိုင္ခဲ့ပါဘူး။ ၉/၁၁ ကိစၥျဖစ္ၿပီးတဲ့ေနာက္မွာ အေမရိကန္ဟာ ပါကစၥတန္နဲ႕ ယံုယံံုၾကည္ၾကည္ လက္တြဲေနတဲ့ တစ္ခ်ိန္တည္းမွာပဲ အိႏၵိယနဲ႕လည္း ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ေရးကို အေလးထားခဲ့ပါတယ္။ ရလဒ္ကေတာ့ ေမာ္စကိုဟာ နယူးေဒလီနဲ႕ ဆက္ဆံေရး သိပ္ေကာင္းေနခဲ့တာ အခုထိပါပဲ။
အိႏၵိယနဲ႕ ႐ုရွားတို႕ဟာ ႏိုင္ငံံေရး စစ္ေရး စီးပြားေရးေတြမွာ နက္နက္ရွိုင္းရွိုင္း လက္တြဲေဆာင္ရြက္ေနၾကပါတယ္။ ႐ုရွားဟာ အိႏၵိယနဲ႕ ကုန္သြယ္ေရးမွာ အေမရိကန္နဲ႔ အၿပိဳင္ ျဖစ္ေနၿပီး ဘဂၤလားပင္လယ္ေအာ္မွာ ရွိတဲ့ စြမ္းအင္စီမံကိန္းေတြနဲ႕ ႐ုရွား စြမ္းအင္ လုပ္ငန္းႀကီးေတြမွာ အိႏၵိယကုမၸနီေတြ အႀကီးအက်ယ္ ရင္းႏွီးျမွပ္ႏွံေနၾကပါတယ္။ ဒါ့အျပင္ ႐ုွရွားကေန အာေရဗ်ပင္လယ္ေအာ္ဘက္ကို ထြက္တဲ့ လမ္းေၾကာင္းကို ႏွစ္ႏိုင္ငံပူးေပါင္း ေဖာ္ေဆာင္ေနၾကၿပီး အဲဒါကလည္း အိႏၵိယသမုဒၵရာတစ္ခုလံုးမွာ ႐ုွရွားေတြ ကုန္သြယ္ႏိုင္ေရးကို အမ်ားႀကီး အေထာက္အကူ ေပးမွာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
အိႏၵိယစစ္ဘက္ရဲ႕ ၇၀ ရာခိုင္ႏွဳန္းေက်ာ္ေသာ လက္နက္စနစ္ေတြကို ႐ုရွားက ေထာက္ပံ့ထားတာျဖစ္ၿပီး ခ႐ုဒံုးပ်ံစနစ္၊ တိုက္ေလယာဥ္နဲ႕ သယ္ယူပို႕ေဆာင္ေရး ေလယာဥ္စီမံကိန္းေတြကို ႏွစ္ႏိုင္ငံ ပူးတြဲ လုပ္ေဆာင္လ်က္ရွိေနပါတယ္။ ကမာၻေပၚမွာ အိႏၵိယနဲ႔ ပူးေပါင္းၿပီး ၀န္ႀကီးအဆင့္ ကာကြယ္ေရးဆိုင္ရာ သံုးသပ္ျခင္းကို ႏွစ္စဥ္ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနတဲ့ နိုင္ငံႏွစ္နိုင္ငံထဲမွာ ႐ုရွားက တစ္ခုအပါအ၀င္ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အာကာသအစီအစဥ္ေတြကိုလည္း ပူးေပါင္း ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနၿပီး ေဒၚလာသန္းေထာင္ေပါင္းမ်ားစြာ တန္ဖိုးရွိတဲ့ န်ဴကလီးယား အစီအစဥ္ေတြကိုလည္း ႏွစ္ႏိုင္ငံသေဘာတူညီခ်က္ေတြ ရယူထားၾကပါတယ္။ ဒီလိုေတြ လုပ္ေနၾကတာက ၀ါရွင္တန္အတြက္ေတာ့ ေခါင္း႐ွုပ္စရာႀကီးေပါ့။
ဘုရွ္လက္ထက္က ႏိုင္ငံျခားေရးမူ၀ါဒ ေအာင္ျမင္မွဳေတြထဲမွာ အိႏၵိယလည္း ပါ၀င္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ စီးပြားဆက္ဆံေရးေတြ ပိုမို နက္႐ွိဳင္းလာခဲ့တယ္။ သံတမန္ဆက္ဆံေရး ပိုမို ခိုင္ၿမဲလာခဲ့တယ္။ ၿပီးေတာ့ န်ဴကလီးယား သေဘာတူညီခ်က္တစ္ရပ္ကိုလည္း လက္မွတ္ေရးထိုးႏိုင္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ ဒါေတြကို ေလ့လာၾကည့္ရင္ အေရွ႕အလယ္ပိုင္းေဒသနဲ႕ အေမရိကန္ရဲ႕ ဆံုမွတ္အသစ္ အာရွတို႕အၾကား ေပါင္းကူးေပးေရးမွာ အိႏၵိယက အေမရိကန္ရဲ႕ သစၥာရွိ ရဲေဘာ္ရဲဘက္တစ္ဦးအေနနဲ႕ ရပ္တည္ေပးလိမ့္မယ္လို႕ ယူဆစရာ ျဖစ္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ သမိုးေၾကာင္းအရလည္း တ႐ုတ္နဲ႕ ဆက္ဆံေရးအားမေကာင္းခဲ့တဲ့ အတြက္ အိႏၵိယဟာ တ႐ုတ္စက္ကြင္းက လြတ္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ တ႐ုတ္ကို ၀ိုင္းပတ္ပိတ္ဆို႕ထားဖို႕ အိႏၵိယကို အားကိုးလို႕ ရနိုင္တယ္ဆိုတဲ့ သေဘာပါ။
ဒါေပမယ့္ ဒါေပမယ့္ေပါ့ေလ။ အိႏၵိယေတြဟာ စစ္ေအးကာလက သူတို႕ရဲ႕ မဟာမိတ္ကို ဘယ္ေတာ့မွ မ်က္ေျခမျဖတ္ခဲ့သလို အေနာက္နိုင္ငံေတြက သူတို႕ကို တျဖည္းျဖည္းခ်င္း နယ္ခ်ဲ႕ ကၽြန္ျပဳသြားတာကိုလည္း အခုထိ သံသယစိတ္ေတြ ထားေနတုန္းပါပဲ။ အေမရိကန္ မူ၀ါဒခ်မွတ္သူေတြကေတာ့ ကုန္သြယ္ေရးျမွင့္တင္တာေတြ န်ဴသေဘာတူညီခ်က္ ရတာေတြနဲ႕တင္ အေမရိကန္ရဲ႕ ထီးရိပ္ေအာက္ကို အိႏၵိယကို ဆြဲသြင္းလို႕ ရမယ္ဆိုၿပီး ခပ္တံုးတံုး ေတြးမိခ်င္ ေတြးမိေနၾကမွာပါ။ အိႏၵိယဟာ တ႐ုတ္တို႕ဘက္မွာ ဘယ္တုန္းကမွ မရပ္တည္ခဲ့ဘူးဆိုတာ မွန္ေကာင္း မွန္ေပမယ့္ စစ္ေအးကာလအတြင္း ခိုင္ၿမဲခဲ့တဲ့ အင္ဒို-႐ုရွား ဆက္ဆံေရးကိုေတာ့ ဘာနဲ႕မွ ေဖ်ာက္ဖ်က္ပစ္လို႕ မရတာကေတာ့ အမွန္ပါပဲ။
ခ႐ိုင္းမီးယားမွာ ႐ုရွားေရႊ႕လိုက္တဲ့ အကြက္ကေလးက ဘာကိုျပသလဲဆိုရင္ ကမာၻေပၚမွာ သတိထားစရာႏိုင္ငံဟာ တ႐ုတ္တစ္ခုတည္းမဟုတ္ဘူးဆိုတာ ႏိုင္ငံတကာ အသိုင္းအ၀ိုင္းကို သတိေပးလိုက္တာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒါေၾကာင့္မို႕လို႕ အေမရိကန္ရဲ႕ အဂၢမဟာဗ်ဴဟာ အစီအစဥ္မွာ အိႏၵိယပါ၀င္တဲ့ အခန္းက႑ကို ျပန္လည္သံုးသပ္ဖို႕ လုိအပ္လာၿပီ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ေသခ်ာတာကေတာ့ လာမယ့္ ဆယ္စုႏွစ္ေတြမွာ အိႏၵိယဟာ အဓိက အခန္းက႑မွာ တင္ဆက္ အသံုးေတာ္ခံေတာ့မွာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဲ့ အင္အားႀကီးထြားလာတဲ့ တ႐ုတ္၊ စြမ္းအင္အရင္းအျမစ္ အေရွ႕အလယ္ပိုင္းေဒနဲ႕ စီးပြားေရး ထြန္းသစ္စ အာဖရိက တို႕အၾကား ပထ၀ီအေနအထားအရ မဟာဗ်ဴဟာက်လွတဲ့ အခ်က္အျခာေနရာကုိ အိႏၵိယတို႕က အပိုင္သိမ္းထားလိုက္ပါၿပီ။ သေဘၤာေပါင္း ၁၅၀ နဲ႕ ေလယာဥ္တင္သေဘၤာမ်ား ပါ၀င္ဖြဲ႕စည္းထားတဲ့ ေရတပ္ကို ပိုင္ဆိုင္တဲ့ အိႏၵိယဟာ ပါရန္ပင္လယ္ေကြ႕၊ မလကၠာေရလက္ၾကားနဲ႕ စူးအက္ေဒသတို႕ရဲ႕ လည္မ်ိဳကို ကိုင္ထားႏိုင္ၿပီး သြားလာေနတဲ့ ေရယာဥ္ေတြရဲ႕ ကံၾကမၼာကို အဆံုးအျဖတ္ ေပးႏိုင္တဲ့ အေနအထားမွာ ရွိေနပါတယ္။ လက္ရွိ ရာစုႏွစ္ အလယ္ေလာက္ေရာက္ရင္ အိႏၵိယရဲ႕ ဂ်ီဒီပီဟာ အေမရိကန္ကို ေက်ာ္တက္ေတာ့မယ္လို႕လည္း ခန္႕မွန္းထားၾကပါတယ္။
ႏိုင္ငံတကာစံႏွဳန္းေတြဟာ ႐ုရွားရဲ႕ တိုက္ခိုက္မွဳကို ခံေနရတဲ့အခ်ိန္မွာ အိႏၵိယဟာ တစ္စိတ္တစ္ပိုင္းပဲ ျဖစ္ျဖစ္ ႐ုရွားနဲ႔ ပူးေပါင္းသြားႏိုင္တဲ့အေရးကို အေမရိကန္ ႏိုင္ငံျခားေရးမူ၀ါဒအေနနဲ႕ စိုးရိမ္ပူပန္သင့္လွပါတယ္။ ကမာၻ႕အႀကီးဆံုးႏိုင္ငံနဲ႕ ကမာၻ႕အႀကီးဆံုး ဒီမိုကေရစီႏိုင္ငံႀကီးတို႕က လက္မခံရင္ နယ္ေျမပူးေပါင္းမွဳဆိုင္ရာ စံႏွဳန္းတန္ဖိုးေတြဟာ ဘယ္ေလာက္အတိုင္းအတာထိ ခိုင္ခိုင္မာမာ ရပ္တည္ႏိုင္မွာလဲ။ အေမရိကန္ ႏိုင္ငံျခားေရးမူ၀ါဒရဲ႕ သည္းေျခႀကိဳက္ သေဘာတရားေတြကို အဲသလိုသာ ျငင္းပယ္ေနေတာ့မယ္ဆိုရင္ အေမရိကန္ဦးေဆာင္တဲ့ ကမာၻႀကီးက ဘယ္ေလာက္ေတာင္ တည္ၿငိမ္ေအးခ်မ္းေတာ့မွာလဲ။ ေမးခြန္းႏွစ္ခုအတြက္ အေျဖကေတာ့ ဟင့္အင္း ပါတဲ့။
အေမရိကန္ ဘာေတြ ဆက္လုပ္သင့္ပါသလဲ။ ၿပီးခဲ့တဲ့ ဆယ္စုႏွစ္ရဲ႕ ၀ါရွင္တန္ ရည္မွန္းခ်က္က အင္အားႀကီးထြားလာတဲ့ တ႐ုတ္ကို ပူးၿပီးခ်ဳပ္တဲ့နည္းနဲ႕ ထိန္းသိမ္းဖို႕ ျဖစ္ေပမယ့္ အလားတူ အင္အားႀကီးထြားလာတဲ့ အိႏၵိယကိုေတာ့ အဲသလို ေကာင္းေကာင္း မလုပ္ႏိုင္ခဲ့ပါဘူး။ အေၾကာင္းကေတာ့ အိႏၵိယဟာ ဒီမိုကေရစီႏိုင္ငံ ဆိုေပမယ့္ အေမရိကန္ အႀကိဳက္ေတြနဲ႕ အလုိလုိေတာ့ ထပ္တူမက်ႏိုင္တာေၾကာင့္ အိႏၵိယေတြ ဘ၀င္ခိုက္မယ့္ ေရရွည္လည္း တည္တံ့တဲ့ နည္းလမ္းေတြနဲ႕  ေသေသခ်ာခ်ာ စီစဥ္လုပ္ေဆာင္ဖို႕ အေမရိကန္တို႕ မလြဲမေသြ လိုအပ္ေနပါၿပီ။ အခုခ်ိန္ထိေတာ့ အိႏၵိယနဲ႕ နီးစပ္ဖို႕ အေမရိကန္ရဲ႕ လိုလားခ်က္ေတြဟာ စစ္ေအးကာလ မဟာမိတ္ ပါကစၥတန္ရဲ႕ သစၥာေစာင့္သိမွဳနဲ႕ အလဲအထပ္ ျဖစ္ေနတုန္းပါပဲ။ ႐ုရွားတို႕အေနနဲ႕ ကက္ရွမီးယားအေရးမွာ အိႏၵိယကို သမိုင္းခ်ီ ေထာက္ခံခဲ့တာဟာလည္း နယူးေဒလီအတြက္ ေပါ့ေသးေသး သေဘာထားရတဲ့ ကိစၥ မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ အေႏွးနဲ႕အျမန္ ဆိုသလို ဒီႏိုင္ငံႏွစ္ခုအေပၚ အေမရိကန္ရဲ႕ ကတိက၀တ္ေတြကို ျပန္လည္ ခ်ိိန္ဆရေတာ့မွာပါ။ ေဒသတြင္း လံုၿခံဳေရးအတြက္ ပါကစၥတန္က အေရးပါေနသလို ကမာၻႀကီးကို စိုးမိုးဖို႕အတြက္ ဆိုရင္လည္း အိႏၵိယရဲ႕ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မွဳဟာလည္း မရွိမျဖစ္ အေရးပါ ေနတာေၾကာင့္ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
အိိႏၵိယနဲ႕ ခင္ခင္မင္မင္ ရင္းရင္းႏွီးႏွီး ဆက္လက္ လက္တြဲဖို႕ဆိုရင္ အိုဘားမား လုပ္ႏိုင္တာ သံုးခု ရွိပါတယ္။ ပထမဆံုး တစ္ခုကေတာ့ အလြယ္ဆံုးပါပဲ။ အိႏၵိယသံတမန္ အမ်ိဳးသမီး Devyani Khobragade နဲ႕ ပတ္သက္တဲ့ အေမရိကန္ရဲ႕ အေရးယူေဆာင္ရြက္ခဲ့မွဳေတြနဲ႕ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး အိႏၵိယကို ျပန္ေတာင္းပန္လိုက္ဖို႕ပါပဲ။ ဒါမွလည္း အေမရိကန္အေပၚ အိႏၵိယက အျမင္ျပန္ၾကည္လာမွာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
ဒုတိယတစ္ခုကေတာ့ အေမရိကန္ဟာ အိႏၵိယနဲ႕ လြပ္လပ္စြာ ကုန္သြယ္မွဳ သေဘာတူညီခ်က္တစ္ခုအတြက္ ကတိျပဳဖို႕ လုိအပ္ပါတယ္။ အိႏၵိယရဲ႕ ခိုင္မာအားေကာင္းတဲ့ ပစၥည္းပိုင္ဆိုင္ခြင့္ စနစ္ရယ္၊ တည္ၿငိမ္တဲ့ ဒီမိုကေရစီစနစ္ရယ္ နဲ႕ အဂၤလိပ္စကားကို ေကာင္းေကာင္းေျပာႏိုင္တဲ့ လူဦးေရပမာဏတစ္ရပ္ကို ပိုင္ဆိုင္ထားတာေတြရယ္ဟာ အေမရိကန္ ရင္းႏွီးျမွပ္ႏွံမွဳေတြ အတြက္ အင္မတန္ႀကီးမားလွတဲ့ အခြင့္အလမ္းပဲ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ သေဘာတူညီခ်က္တစ္ခုဟာ အေမရိကန္ေရာ အိႏၵိယျပည္သူေတြအတြက္ပါ အက်ိဳးအျမတ္ ျဖစ္ထြန္းေစမွာ ျဖစ္ၿပီး ႏွစ္ႏိုင္ငံ ရင္းႏွီးခ်စ္ၾကည္မွဳလည္း ပိုၿပီး ခိုင္ၿမဲလာမွာ ျဖစ္တာေၾကာင့္ ကမာၻ႕စီးပြားေရး ေလာကမွာလည္း ဂုဏ္သိကၡာ ပိုတက္လာမွာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
တတိယတစ္ခုကေတာ့ ကုလသမဂၢလံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စီမွာ အိႏၵိယႏိုင္ငံ အၿမဲတမ္း တစ္ေနရာ ရေနဖို႕အတြက္ မိမိတို႕ေထာက္ခံခ်က္နဲ႕ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး အေမရိကန္တို႕အေနနဲ႕ ေလးေလးနက္နက္ ျပန္လည္သံုးသပ္သင့္ပါတယ္။ ကာလေရြ႕ေလ်ာတာနဲ႕အမွ် အေမရိကန္ရဲ႕ အင္အားေတြ အက်ဘက္ေရာက္လာတာကို အျမတ္ထုတ္ၿပီး အနာဂတ္ ဗဟုမ႑ိဳင္အေျခအေနမွာ ေနရာယူ အသံုးေတာ္ခံလာေတာ့မွာကို အေမရိကန္ သေဘာေပါက္ပါတယ္။ ကမာၻႀကီးရဲ႕ အနာဂတ္ အစီအစဥ္ေတြကို ႀကိဳတင္ လက္ဦးထားၿပီး အိႏၵိယနဲ႕ ဘရာဇီးတို႕လို အေမရိကန္အလိုက် လိုက္ပါေပးၾကမယ့္ တက္ေန၀န္းႏိုင္ငံေတြနဲ႕ ရင္းႏွီးခ်စ္ၾကည္ ယံုၾကည္မွဳ တည္ေဆာက္ထားရင္ အေမရိကန္တို႕အေနနဲ႕ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းၾကြယ္၀တဲ့ ကမာၻႀကီးကို ေနာက္မ်ိဳးဆက္ေတြလက္ထဲ ေကာင္းေကာင္း လက္ဆင့္ကမ္းႏိုင္မွာပါ။
၀ါရွင္တန္ကို သတိေပးလိုက္ပါရေစ
ခ႐ိုင္းမီးယားမွာရွိတဲ့ ႐ုရွားရဲ႕ အက်ိဳးစီးပြားေတြကို ကိုယ္ခ်င္းစာနာေပးတဲ့ အိႏၵိယရဲ႕ ရပ္တည္ခ်က္ဟာ အရင္တုန္းက စြာႏိုင္ခဲ့တဲ့ ငပြႀကီးက အေရးမပါေတာ့ဘူးဆိုတဲ့အေၾကာင္း အေမရိကန္ အရာရွိေတြကို သံေခ်ာင္းေခါက္ သတိေပးလိုက္တာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ႏိုင္ငံတကာေရးရာ ကိစၥရပ္ေတြနဲ႕ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး အၿမဲတမ္း ေထာက္ခံေပးခဲ့တဲ့ အိႏၵိယကို ေရွ႕ဆက္ၿပီးေတာ့ မေမွ်ာ္လင့္ေတာ့နဲ႕လို႕ အေမရိကန္ကို သတိေပးလိုက္တာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အိႏၵိယရဲ႕ ေထာက္ခံကာကြယ္ေပးမွဳကို ဆက္ၿပီး လုိခ်င္ေသးတယ္ဆိုရင္ မူ၀ါဒေတြ ေျပာင္းဖို႕ လုပ္ေတာ့လို႕ အေမရိကန္ကို သတိေပးလိုက္တာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ လစ္ဘရယ္မက်တဲ့ ဒီမိုကေရစီမဆန္တဲ့ ႐ုရွားလို ႏိုင္ငံမ်ိဳးနဲ႕ က်ားကန္ေနမယ့္အစား ကမာၻလံုးဆိုင္ရာ စံႏွဳန္းေတြအေပၚမွာပဲ အေျချပဳၿပီး ကိုယ့္ကိုယ္ကို တည္ေဆာက္ထားမွသာ အိႏၵိယလို ႏိုင္ငံမ်ိဳးကို မိမိ ႏိုင္ငံျခားေရးမူ၀ါဒရဲ႕ အခ်က္အျခာမွာ အခိုင္အမာ လက္တြဲထားႏိုင္မွာျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း အေမရိကန္တို႕ကို သတိေပးလိုက္ပါတယ္။
( The Diplomat ၏ ၂၀၁၄ ခုနွစ္ မတ္လ ၂၄ ရက္၊ ေဆာင္းပါးရွင္ By တို႕၏ Indian Foreign Policy: The Cold War Lingers ေဆာင္းပါးအား ျပန္ဆိုပါသည္) မူရင္းေဆာင္းပါးအား ေအာက္တြင္ ဖတ္ရွဳႏိုင္ပါသည္။

http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/indian-foreign-policy-the-cold-war-lingers/

In the wake of the Vladimir Putin’s incursion into Crimea, almost every member of the international community voiced concern over Russia’s actions. While the U.S. and European Union were the most forceful in their criticism, non-Western states such as China and even Iran also made clear their support for the principles of non-intervention, state sovereignty and territorial integrity – oblique criticisms of Moscow’s disregard for cornerstone Westphalian norms. For the most part, support for Russia has been confined to the predictable incendiaries: Cuba, Venezuela and Syria, for example. Yet there is one unusual suspect among those lining up behind Putin that requires further investigation: India.
On its face, New Delhi’s enunciation of respect for Russia’s “legitimate interests” in Crimea is a surprising blow to the prevailing U.S. policy of reaching out to India. As the largest democracy in the world, a burgeoning capitalist economy and an increasingly important military power, India has been viewed as a counterweight to China’s rise and an anchor of the U.S.-led international order. India’s support for Russia’s revisionism in Crimea, then, is something that should trouble U.S. policymakers. In the long run, India’s response to the Crimean crisis might even be remembered as one of the more important implications of the whole episode. For how India aligns in the coming multipolar world will have enormous ramifications.
India’s support for Putin is a reminder that the West should not take India’s friendship for granted. To be sure, India made a necessary shift in tone towards the West following the collapse of the Soviet Union. India has liberalized its economy and become a strategic partner in several key areas. But the past two decades of broad cooperation should not be taken as an inexorable trend towards a complete harmonization of interests between India and the West. Amid all the talk of a renewed Cold War in Europe it has been forgotten that, for India, Cold War international relations never truly ended. In particular, the Indo-Russian relationship remains an important mainstay of Indian grand strategy – a hangover from that bygone era.
The years following the collapse of the Soviet empire saw the U.S. mainly concerned with a failed attempt to curb India’s nuclear program. After 9/11, America’s attention was focused on partnership with India while still maintaining the confidence and cooperation of Pakistan. Both periods of engagement, however, left the Indo-U.S. relationship well short of the kind of deep cooperation that marked Indo-Soviet relations during the Cold War. The result has been that Moscow still enjoys a thoroughly positive relationship with New Delhi.
India and Russia maintain deep cooperation on political, military and economic dimensions. Russian trade with India rivals the latter’s trade with the United States, and Indian companies have made huge investments in Russian energy firms and energy projects in the Bay of Bengal. In addition, the two nations are developing a southern route from Russia to the Arabian Sea that will increase Russian trade in the whole of the Indian Ocean region.
Russia still provides India’s military with more than 70 percent of its weapons systems and armaments and the two are currently cooperating in the development of cruise missile systems, strike fighters and transport aircraft. Russia is one of only two countries in the world that have annual ministerial-level defense reviews with India. The two cooperate on the advancement of a space program and they have bilateral nuclear agreement worth potentially tens of billions of dollars. Such deep and expansive ties with Russia complicate India’s multifarious importance from the perspective of Washington (as a cog in the U.S. “pivot” to Asia, an indispensable ally in the War on Terror and a bustling hub of the global economy).
After the Bush administration left office, India was heralded as one of the foreign policy success stories of his presidency. Economic relations had been deepened, diplomatic ties strengthened, a nuclear agreement signed. All indications were that India would be a stalwart American ally at a strategic nexus between the Middle East and the new focus on Asia. Historically poor relations with China would keep India safely out of the Chinese orbit. India could be relied upon to help encircle China, a vital link in a twenty-first century cordon sanitaire around the muscular Middle Kingdom.
But India never lost sight of its historic Cold War ally and the Indian people have never fully lost their suspicion of Western powers and creeping colonialism. American policymakers may have been overly naïve in thinking that economic growth, increased trade and a nuclear deal could move India safely into the American camp. Perhaps it is true that India will never cement itself on China’s side, but the fact is that nothing has been done to erase the deep Indo-Russian ties that formed during decades of Cold War.
Putin’s stratagem in Crimea has reminded the world that China is not the only rising or resurgent Great Power deserving of attention. As such, officials need to reconsider India’s place in American grand strategy. There is no doubt that India (itself a rising state with the potential to become a geopolitical pole in its own right) will remain a prominent player in the decades ahead. India occupies a crucial geostrategic location between a rising China, the energy producing regions of the Middle East and a newly vigorous African economy. An expanding Indian navy featuring 150 ships and multiple aircraft carriers will possess the capability to exercise veto power over key shipping choke points in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Malacca, and Suez region. Economic forecasts suggest India will surpass the GDP of the United States somewhere in the middle of the century.
It should greatly concern the American foreign policy establishment that, at a moment when international norms are under assault by Moscow, India has chosen to (at least partially) throw its lot in with Russia. How strong can a norm of territorial integrity be without the world’s largest nation and the world’s largest democracy? How stable can the American-led global order be with such a prominent repudiation of American foreign policy preferences? The answer to both of these questions is, unfortunately, “not very.”
What should be done? The past decade has seen a consistent focus by Washington to integrate and contain a rising China, but not enough has been done to integrate and build ties with a rising India. Simply because India is a democracy does not mean that it will automatically align itself to American preferences, and the United States must make a concerted effort to win India’s favor and goodwill in a lasting way. Until now, closeness with India has been compromised by competing demands to remain faithful to Pakistan, America’s own Cold War-era ally. Indeed, Russia’s historic support for Indian claims over Kashmir (sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit) has been no small part of Moscow’s appeal to New Delhi. Sooner or later, a new balance must be struck between U.S. commitments to these two nations. While Pakistan is integral to regional security, India’s cooperation will be essential to sustain the American vision of global governance.
The Obama administration can lay the groundwork for a more intimate relationship with India by doing three things. First, and easiest, the United States must clear up the detention and mistreatment of Devyani Khobragade. Far greater crimes have been excused for much less than would be gained in terms of Indian public opinion if the U.S. were to show flexibility towards Khobragade. Whether charges truly are warranted or not, Washington must at least apologize for her treatment in order to mitigate the blow that has been dealt to Indian impressions of the United States.
Second, the U.S. needs to commit itself to the establishment of a free trade agreement with India. India presents an enormous opportunity for American investment, with its stable system of property rights, consolidated democracy, and English-speaking population. An agreement will benefit both the Indian and American peoples, and intertwine the two nations to the high degree that their statures in the global economy mandate.
Third, the United States should seriously reconsider its support for a permanent Indian seat on the United Nations Security Council. If time is running out on the post-WWII international order, it makes sense for the U.S. to exploit its waning preponderant influence and play a major role in fashioning the future of the multipolar order. By seizing the agenda and winning the friendship and trust of rising countries (especially India and Brazil) that generally abide by an American-friendly set of global rules, the United States can promote the existence of a favorable global environment of peace and prosperity for generations to come.
Washington has been warned: India’s expression of sympathy for Russian interests in Crimea should serve as an alarm bell for American officials that a crucial player in world affairs has gone neglected. India’s enlistment as a card-carrying supporter of the existing international order simply cannot be counted upon going forward. If the U.S. wants India to serve as a bulwark of the international status quo, some form of policy change will be required. By shifting India to the front and center of American foreign policy, the United States can help to assure for itself – and the wider world – a future based on prevailing global norms rather than the designs of revisionist, illiberal and undemocratic states like Russia.
Andrew J. Stravers is a PhD student at the University of Texas at Austin, where he studies the global role of the American military. He is also an Aiddata Center for Development Policy Fellow and a researcher on the Department of Defense Minerva Initiative’s project on natural resource and armed conflict. Peter Harris is a doctoral candidate in Government at the University of Texas at Austin, where he is also a graduate fellow of the Clements Center for History, Strategy and Statecraft.