Saturday 5 March 2016

Constitutional Rigidity and Myanmar Democratization

Introduction

Myanmar was under the military regime named State Law and Order Restoration Council, and State Peace and Development Council for more than twenty years. The military government drew a constitution and promulgated it in 2008, and as a consequence, a general election was held in 2010. The main opposition party, National League for Democracy (NLD) boycotted the 2010 elections. The newly elected government was established in 2011 led by President U Thein Sein, the head of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The USDP government could make important reforms and could persuade the trust of the opposition groups. As soon as the president took the office, a negotiation took place between the president and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the chair of NLD. As a consequence, NLD decided to run the 2012 by-elections and won 43 out of 44 seats in the parliament.

Issues

In the election campaign for 2012 by-elections, the NLD made three commitments and one of which coincides with an item on the president’s reform agenda. Both of the ruling party and the opposition party have the same view on the necessity of making changes in the constitution. The ruling party believes that the constitution needs to make changes in order to meet the demands of the ethnic minorities and to build peace in the country. However, the NLD’s concern is to remove undemocratic provisions from the constitution. Despite different opinions on how to make changes in the constitution, a common challenge for both parties is the higher rigidity of the constitution.

According to Chapter 7, article 436 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, over 75 percent “Yes” vote could pass a bill of constitutional amendment which means the constitution cannot be amended without the consent of the Tatmadaw (Defense Services) because 25 percent of the parliament seats are occupied by the military personnel nominate by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services.

From the Tatmadaw point of view, they assume themselves as a guardian institution of the democracy, and they do not want anything which could have a negative impact on the democratization of the country. The Tatmadaw believes that the current pace of democratization is the most suitable for the country, and the constitution should not be changed very urgently. The reason is that maintaining the status quo of the constitution is a need to be in harmony with the democratization process.

However, the ruling party proposed “a bill of constitutional amendment” in the parliament in June 2015. The bill included a major change in article 436 “constitutional amendment process” by replacing “over 75%” with “70%” yes vote of the parliament to pass a bill of amending the constitution, which means that the constitution must be able to make changes without the approval of the 25% Tatmadaw MPs. As expected, the parliament could not pass the bill since it received only 66.55% of votes in favor because the Tatmadaw (and some other MPs) did not agree to give up the “veto power” for amending the constitution. Therefore, the constitution of Myanmar still needs over 75% approvals (at least one Tatmadaw MP’s yes vote) of the parliament, and it keeps the status quo of constitutional rigidity.

Discussion and Conclusion

In the last October 2015 general elections, NLD won a landslide victory and could occupy the majority seats of the both houses of the parliament. It is very likely that the NLD will also try to remove the veto of the Tatmadaw in the process of the constitutional amendment, and the Tatmadaw will again reject it. The attempt of the NLD would end up with a political tension between the Tatmadaw and NLD because the Tatmadaw will never give up its political involvement until the problems of the ethnic armed groups have been solved. At the same time, the political involvement of the Tatmadaw would be denied if the constitution could be amendment without the consent of the Tatmadaw MPs.

In my opinion, the constitution is too rigid to make a change which is essentially important for the development of democratization. On the other hand, the concern of the Tatmadaw on democratization pace should also be appreciated. However, these two factors should not be the two extremes for considering Myanmar democratization development. Therefore, the best way to reduce the rigidity of the constitution without neglecting the concern of the Tatmadaw is negotiating between the stakeholders of the NLD and the Tatmadaw. Both parties should understand and recognize each other’s concerns because mutual understanding is very important for corporation and trust building. If the NLD and the Tatmadaw could successfully cooperate in state building, then the rigidity of the constitution would no longer a barrier to the future democratization of the country. 

Reference

Hnin Yadana Zaw. (2015, June 25). Myanmar military retains veto after constitution change veto fails. Retrieved January 20, 2016, from http://www.reuters.com
Myanmar Parliament Begins Debate on Bill to Amend Constitution. (2015, June 23). Retrieved January 20, 2016, from http://www.rfa.org
President Thein Sein's Inangural Speech. (2011, March 31). The Global New Light of Myanmar
The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008)
Z. Wendy. (2014, November 3). Burma: Pledge to Consider Amending Constitutional Provision Giving Military the Power to Veto Amendments. Retrieved January 20, 2016, from http://www.loc.gov







Professor's Comment

The paper focuses on the constitutional rigidity in Myanmar. It describes the democratic transition in 2010, the requirement for the constitutional amendment, and the Tatmadaw’s and NLD’s stances toward the constitutional rigidity. The description is clear, and the discussions are rigorous and insightful. Nicely done.


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